How Tanzania is Affected by the Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

I. The Strait of Hormuz: The World's Most Critical Energy Chokepoint

To understand why a distant maritime bottleneck matters to Tanzania, one must first grasp the staggering scale of the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman carries approximately 20.9 million barrels of oil per day — equivalent to 20% of global daily oil consumption — along with a similar share of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the daily energy trade through Hormuz is worth nearly $600 billion annually. It is, by any measure, the single most strategically critical energy corridor on the planet.

Since late February 2026, escalating regional tensions, Iranian threats to shipping, and dramatically increased war‑risk insurance premiums have created the most severe Hormuz disruption in decades. The strait has been effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. According to UNCTAD, the Strait of Hormuz remains "virtually closed, with effects spreading through the global economy within weeks by disrupting energy flows, raising prices and increasing financial pressure on developing countries." For oil‑dependent, net‑importing economies like Tanzania, such price pressures can translate quickly into higher fuel costs, inflationary pressure, and wider trade deficits.

II. Tanzania's Fuel Dependency: 59% from the Middle East

Tanzania is deeply reliant on imported petroleum. According to Minister for Energy Dr. Deogratius Ndejembi, the country imports approximately 59% of its petroleum products from Middle Eastern countries, while the remaining 41% comes from India — which itself relies on crude oil sourced from the same region. In total, Tanzania imports about 5 billion litres of fuel annually, and petrol and diesel alone account for nearly 25% of the national import bill.

Before the US–Iran war, East Africa sourced around 36% of its oil products directly from Gulf ports, according to data intelligence firm Kpler. Following the blockade, imports into key markets — Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique — fell to zero in April 2026 for the first time in more than a decade. While product flows have been partially maintained from Middle Eastern ports outside the Strait, such as Fujairah, Duqm, and Yanbu, as well as India's west coast, the region has been dangerously close to severe shortages.

The impact on pump prices has been immediate and brutal. In a public notice, the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) announced new cap prices for petroleum products effective April 2026. Retail petrol in Dar es Salaam rose sharply from TZS 2,864 ($1.10) to TZS 3,820 ($1.53) per litre — a more than 30% increase. Diesel climbed from TZS 2,951 ($1.15) to TZS 3,806 ($1.52), while kerosene, widely used by low‑income households, now costs TZS 3,684 ($1.48) per litre. In inland regions such as Mara, Mwanza, Kagera, and Kigoma, petrol and diesel prices exceeded TZS 4,000 ($1.60) per litre.

III. How Ordinary Tanzanians Are Bearing the Cost

The crisis is not an abstract economic phenomenon — it is being felt daily in the pockets and lives of ordinary Tanzanians. As Prosper Makene reported in a widely cited analysis, a sustained increase in global oil prices of even $10 per barrel can push domestic fuel prices up by 5–8%, depending on exchange rate movements. For a transport‑dependent economy, that increase ripples through every sector.

Transport operators feel it first. Daladala operators in Dar es Salaam, long‑distance bus companies on the Central Corridor, and truckers hauling cargo from Dar es Salaam Port to Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC all face higher operating expenses. A daladala owner operating the Kinondoni route reported that a full tank of fuel used to cost TZS 180,000 — now it is nearly TZS 280,000. Many have been forced to raise fares or freight rates, which then increases the cost of moving food, building materials, and manufactured goods.

The human voice of the crisis is unmistakable. Neema Joseph, a market vendor in Dar es Salaam, reported: "The daladala fare from Ubungo to Kariakoo goes up by 200 shillings. My salary hasn't changed, but I'm paying more just to get to work." James Mwakalinga, a long‑distance traveller, added: "The bus ticket from Dar to Dodoma was 35,000 shillings last month. Now it's 45,000. We have no choice but to pay if we want to travel." Long‑haul trucker Elias Mrope, who moves cargo to Rwanda, put it plainly: "The price of diesel determines whether I make a profit or go home empty. When fuel goes up, the whole chain suffers."

IV. Agriculture and Food Security: The Hidden Crisis

Tanzania's agricultural sector — which employs the majority of the population — is deeply vulnerable to the Hormuz disruption. The sector relies on diesel‑powered irrigation pumps, tractors, and cold storage. Higher fuel costs make farming more expensive and reduce profit margins for smallholder farmers. At the same time, the cost of transporting maize, rice, vegetables, and meat from rural production areas to urban markets rises, contributing directly to food inflation in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Arusha.

The crisis extends beyond fuel to fertiliser. The Middle East and Eastern Europe historically supply nearly 60% of East Africa's chemical fertilisers. The Strait of Hormuz carries approximately a third of global nitrogen fertiliser trade. Supply chain disruptions have driven the spot prices of urea and diammonium phosphate up by roughly 38%. Within days of the crisis, nitrogen fertiliser prices rose by 30–40%, while urea prices jumped 43% in a single week. This input inflation threatens to reduce regional crop yields by 10–15% in the upcoming planting season. Countries along the Indian Ocean sourcing 30–50% of fertiliser supplies from Gulf producers face heightened food inflation risks. As the Bank of Tanzania notes, low‑income households spend a larger share of income on food, transport, and energy — making them the most affected.

V. Tourism: Disrupted but Not Defeated

Tanzania's tourism sector — a cornerstone of the national economy — has been caught in the crossfire. The immediate impact has been on connectivity: the closure of Gulf‑based airline hubs has disrupted the flow of international visitors to Kilimanjaro, Dar es Salaam, and Zanzibar. Air Tanzania has not been flying to Dubai since the crisis began. Travel agencies reported mass cancellations: as Mustapha Khatow of Sky Link Travel and Tours explained, "Tanzanian travel agents have been hit, because we've had huge cancellations for Eid, people going to Dubai, for Easter holidays."

The cost of operating a safari has risen sharply. Safari vehicles are diesel‑powered, and a typical safari from Dar es Salaam to Mikumi National Park can consume 150–250 litres. With diesel prices climbing over 30%, safari operators are seeing transport costs increase and profit margins shrink. Some operators have been forced to adjust package pricing for new bookings.

However, Tanzania's tourism story is not entirely negative. As one security assessment notes, "It is thousands of kilometres from the Middle East. There are no direct security impacts on tourism in Tanzania related to the conflict. Travellers continue to visit for safaris, trekking, and beach holidays." Moreover, the redirection of tourists away from Middle Eastern destinations could eventually benefit Tanzania. Reports indicate that visitor arrivals in the Middle East could decline by 11–27% in 2026, and many of those travellers may seek safe alternatives. Tanzania's reputation as a peaceful, stable country positions it attractively for tourists seeking safety.

VI. The Government Response: Strategic Reserves and Presidential Austerity

The Tanzanian government has not been passive. In an extraordinary move reflecting the seriousness of the crisis, President Samia Suluhu Hassan ordered government officials to travel together in a single bus for official business, dramatically reducing the presidential convoy — which typically includes over 30 vehicles — to only essential security and backup vehicles. "From now on, wherever I go, all officials will travel together in one bus… to cut fuel consumption," the President said.

The Ministry of Energy, under Dr. Deogratius Ndejembi, has implemented strategic interventions. These include empowering the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) to procure sufficient fuel stocks to cover at least three months of national demand. According to the Petroleum Bulk Procurement Agency (PBPA), Tanzania held 230 million litres of petrol (38 days), 180 million litres of diesel (47 days), and 31 million litres of aviation fuel (91 days) as of late March. Additional shipments totalling 245 million litres of petrol, 208 million litres of diesel, and 23 million litres of jet fuel were secured for delivery between May and July. Authorities also moved to curb hoarding and artificial shortages through inspections of private storage depots and real‑time tracking of fuel shipments.

The government continues to closely monitor developments in the global oil market and has stated its readiness to respond quickly to any changes that could affect supply or prices. These efforts are aimed at ensuring stability in transport, production, and daily economic activities that depend heavily on fuel.

VII. Why Tanzania May Withstand the Shock: Structural Resilience

Despite the severity of the external shock, Tanzania possesses several structural buffers that may soften the long‑term blow. As one analysis convincingly argues, Tanzania's greatest defence is, ironically, its lack of energy sophistication. While the country imports about 5 billion litres of fuel annually, that represents only about 10% of total energy supply. A staggering 85% of Tanzania's energy comes from biomass. Crucially, the country has "de‑oiled" its electricity grid — it no longer relies on diesel or heavy fuel oil for power generation. If imported LPG (cooking gas) is disrupted, urban dwellers — two‑thirds of whom already use charcoal — can pivot back to charcoal.

The country's gold exports provide a powerful macroeconomic buffer. According to the Bank of Tanzania's Monthly Economic Review for April 2026, gold exports generated $3.771 billion in the year ending March 2025 and $5.2 billion in the year ending March 2026, accounting for an estimated 30–40% of Tanzania's foreign exchange earnings. As the BoT notes, "Historically, periods of geopolitical tension tend to drive both oil and gold prices upward," providing Tanzania with a crucial hedge. Bank of Tanzania Governor Emmanuel Tutuba confirmed that without the gold cushion, financing essential imports such as fuel would be far more challenging.

Additionally, manufacturing contributes only 9% to Tanzania's GDP, and most factories use grid electricity rather than oil — diesel accounts for just 12% of industrial energy use, almost exclusively for backup generators. Tanzania also imports the bulk of consumer goods from China, whose coal‑based industrial base is less affected by the Hormuz crisis — and Iran has notably allowed ships destined for China to pass unimpeded.

VIII. The Broader African Context: A Continent Exposed

Tanzania's experience is not isolated. Across Africa, the Hormuz blockade has exposed deep structural vulnerabilities. The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) warned that Africa faces an 86‑million‑tonne fuel gap by 2040, with the continent importing over 70% of its refined fuel and some $230 billion worth of essential goods annually. "Not only is it importing fuel, but on the eastern side of the continent, those imports are vulnerable to chokepoints — we've all learned about the Strait of Hormuz this year," said AFC chief economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze.

A $20 rise in oil prices alone could drag Tanzania's current account down by close to 1% of GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics estimates. Other East African nations — Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda — face similar or greater exposure. Across the continent, the fallout threatens capital outflows, depreciating currencies, weaker foreign‑exchange positions, and increased borrowing costs. With upward pressure on inflation, central banks hoping to cut policy interest rates may need to delay planned cuts or even hike rates to control inflation — directly hurting economic growth.

IX. Final Verdict: A Resilient Economy Tested

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a powerful reminder that, in a globalised economy, no country is truly insulated from distant geopolitical shocks. Tanzania suffers through higher fuel bills, costlier food, reduced tourism receipts, and tighter household budgets. The daladala fare increase, the bus ticket surcharge, and the rising cost of maize flour in Kariakoo are all directly traceable to a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman.

Yet Tanzania is not without defences. Its energy structure — heavily biomass‑based, with a de‑oiled electricity grid — provides a buffer that more industrialised African economies lack. Its gold exports offer a foreign exchange cushion that turns a geopolitical crisis into a partial hedge. And its government, while not able to control global oil prices, has demonstrated proactive measures to manage the domestic impact.

The crisis ultimately underscores the urgent need for Tanzania to accelerate energy diversification, invest in domestic refining capacity, and build resilience against the next supply chain shock. At African Majestic Adventure, we continue to monitor the situation closely, ensuring that our safari operations adapt to fuel price realities while keeping our guests safe, informed, and connected to the wild beauty of Tanzania — a beauty that, for all the turmoil in distant straits, remains timelessly open.